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Europe is  beset  by crises.  This refrain resounds today from all  corners and
under many guises: economic, social, geopolitical and environmental. Yet there
is no consensus on what defines these crises. Even the meaning of the subject
of the refrain, “Europe”, is a matter of contention. Is Europe the entity that
shall face and possibly overcome these crises or is it only passively subjected to
them? Over the last few years many attempts have been made by philosophers
and intellectuals to write petitions and manifestos to give remedy the lack of
clarity about the very idea of Europe and the possible outcomes of its crises;1
there is indeed widespread confusion and doubts not only amongst Europe’s
political,  economic  and  cultural  elites,  but  also  amongst  its  citizenry
concerning Europe’s identity, task, role in the world, and even whether Europe
exists in a relevant sense.
This Special  Issue of  Metodo aims at addressing the issue of “crisis” from
different  angles.  Our  contention  is,  indeed,  that  an  analysis  of  the  crisis
concept, and in particular of the kind of crises which are currently affecting
Europe, necessarily requires multidisciplinary insights into the problem, which
range from philosophy to political theory, from economy to law. By engaging
different  approaches  and languages,  this  Issue  aims  at  generating  an  open
debate on this topic.
* Correspondence: Emanuele Caminada, Francesco Tava - Husserl-Archives: Centre for Phenomenology
and Continental Philosophy Kardinaal Mercierplein 2 - box 3200 3000 Leuven, Belgium.
1 See PIKETTY et al. 2014; BALIBAR 2013.
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In step with the general orientation of Metodo, we have also encouraged the
submission of papers specifically focused on the issue of contemporary crises
through  the  lens  of  phenomenological  philosophy.2 Can  phenomenological
methods and the various traditions of phenomenological philosophy be of help
in  understanding  the  current  crises  in  their  entangled  social,  political  and
economic  dimensions?  To  answer  this  question  we  propose  a  twofold
approach:  first,  philosophical arguments and suggested methods have to be
historically contextualised and brought back to their leading intuitions. Second,
these  arguments  can  be  tentatively  applied  to  contemporary  issues.  With
regard to the context in which phenomenology addressed the crisis problem,
we might especially recall the aftermath of the First World War as the time in
which this field of studies emerged. In that tumultuous period, Max Scheler
pinpointed the loss of political leadership of Europe and tried to envisage a
new global, cultural leadership for Europe.3 This diagnosis became even clearer
after  1933,  when  Husserl  detected  the  decline  of  the  unitary  spirit  of  the
“European sciences” and pleaded for a renewal of Enlightenment and practical
rationality,  as  the  only  chance  to  successfully  contrast  the  spreading  of
totalitarianism in Central Europe. Even after the end of the war, however, while
the EU institutions were being shaped through a vibrant confrontation between
functionalist and federalist orientations, some of the most well-known heirs of
Husserlian philosophy maintained a keen interest in the idea and construction
of  Europe.  Among them,  the  Czech  philosopher  Jan  Patočka  coined in  the
1970s  the  idea  of  “post-Europe”.4 With this  phrase,  Patočka did not  aim to
suggest a simple overcoming of Europe, neither as a geographical entity nor as
a  political  project,  but  rather  emphasized  the  necessity  to  create  a  post-
European perspective, i.e. a new theoretical standpoint, from which one can
look  after  Europe outside of its  spatial  and historical  borders,  giving up any
strained syncretism aimed at the conciliation of the very different European
realities under a principle of identity. Precisely to the contrary, a post-European
perspective, according to Patočka, would consist in facing Europe and its crises,
striving to hold its inner complexity wide open. After the Velvet Revolution in
1989, the foundation of the European Union in 1992, and the enlargement of
the Union to Central and Eastern Europe during the following years, one can
legitimately ask whether and how Patočka’s perspective can still supply valid
arguments to the current debates on Europe’s status.
2 See, in particular, HUSSERL 1970.
3 SCHELER 1960, 185.
4 See, in particular, PATOČKA 1988, 207-287.
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Besides the necessary contextualization, one might ask whether and how a
phenomenological insight can be useful in light of the current version of the
European crisis.  In other  words,  can phenomenology serve once again as a
valid critical standpoint, and provide us with a valuable method for tackling
the predominance of economy over politics,  as it  emerged over the last  few
decades,  as  well  as  the  inability  of  European institutions  to  draft  a  shared
political  agenda,  beyond  individual  economic  interests?  In  light  of  this
question, it  is noteworthy that whilst Heidegger’s critique of technology has
recently become a commonplace in contemporary anti-capitalist doctrines, only
little attention has been payed to Husserl’s position, and to his account of the
crisis of European reason. One of the aims of this issue is precisely to create
new intercontextual interactions between Husserl’s insight into Europe’s crisis
and more recent analyses of the various forms of today’s crisis. 
Many contributions to this issue respond to this general aim. In his article,
Kenneth KNIES particularly addresses Husserl’s concepts of Crisis and Europe
and  provides  a  qualified  defence  of  them  against  the  critique  of  being
philosophically  and  politically  irrelevant.  Husserl  understood  the  “crisis  of
European civilization” as a crisis of rationality, i.e. as the loss of the belief that
reason constitutes the means for a universal critique of life goals. For Husserl,
Europe represents a historical, supranational unity which is guided by the idea
of rational science as an infinite task of cultural renewal. In this regard, KNIES
stresses  that  the  primary  focus  of  Husserl’s  Crisis does  not  lie  in  the
epistemological  critique  of  the  premises  of  objective  sciences,  but  rather
consists in counteracting the loss of their meaning, showing how this loss is
mostly caused by the increasing narrowness of scope and aims pursued by
objective sciences. Whilst at the beginning of the twentieth Century the hope
that scientific reason would provide an ultimate, responsible conduct of life
seemed to be lost, Husserl claimed that objectivist specialization threatens to
cause the “finitization” of the horizons of rationality and the application of
scientific  technology  for  misappropriating  and  de-humanizing  ends  –  the
more, indeed, scientific specialization drives technological progress, the more
this  specialization  also  shows  how  rationality  is  not  concerned  with  ends.
According to KNIES, this crisis cannot be historically circumscribed to Husserl’s
concerns regarding the turmoil of Central Europe in the 1930s, but is rather
essentially related to science as such.
How  can  one  successfully  face  this  collapse  of  the  belief  in  rationality?
Husserl aims at showing that science can play the role for which it was meant,
only  if  it  is  brought  back  to  its  original  task.  Renewing  this  task  means
reintroducing the idea of a universal science, whose genealogy goes along with
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the one of philosophy, and whose aim consists in fostering a radical reform and
enhancement of human civilization.
The European Renaissance especially embodied this task, as it believed in the
transformation of humanity by means of universal reason. The European era,
though,  understood  as  the  era  in  which  scientific  thought  and  technique
blossomed,  is  vulnerable  at  its  core  and  can  easily  cause  unvertainty  and
scepticism,  insofar  as  modern  science  is  intrinsically  entangled  with
methodological  crises  and  existential  problems  due  to  its  technological
application.  Particularly,  the  “finitization”  of  science’s  universal  horizon  –
which, from an encompassing critique of life-goals, ends up becoming a stark
implementation of objectivist procedures aimed at economic wealth – makes
science even more vulnerable to the abuses of authoritarian and totalitarian
political leaders. Indeed, once the faith in reason was lost, totalitarian accounts
of nation, class and race hit Europe, and science became a tool for imperialistic
projects – this is the link between the intrinsic crisis of the European sciences
and  the  historical  crises  which  are  explicitly  and  implicitly  addressed  by
Husserl.
KNIES claims  that  Husserl’s  answer  to  the  crisis  is  both  philosophically
(epistemologically)  and  (geo-)politically  relevant:  Europe  as  such  was  born
when  European  intellectuals  committed  themselves  to  infinite  tasks  that
undermined the ability of states to project  an ultimate life-horizon for their
citizens.  As a consequence of this, the provinciality of home-nations became
the  main  critical  target  of  those  European  intellectuals  who  strived  for  a
renewal of local  customs and norms on rational  bases. Accordingly,  Europe
became  a  supranational  project,  a  spreading  synthesis  of  nations  not  only
united by their common origins but rather entangled in a rational exchange of
ideas and infinite tasks.
But what if  Europe,  this  supranational  and rational  project,  fails?  What if
science loses its infinite horizon? What if its abuses for the sake of economy, of
race or of state destroy the same civilisation from which it stemmed? Husserl
identifies  the  only  possible  path  out  of  the  crisis  in  a  renewed (European)
“heroism  of  reason”.5 However,  KNIES suggests  that  Husserl  was  wrong  in
believing  that  scientific  rationality  can be  only European and suggests  that
decolonization  may  be  an  even  more  radical  task  to  overcome  intellectual
provinciality.
The standpoints of modern philosophies in Asia, Africa and Latin America
are in fact essential, according to Hans  SCHELKSHORN, in order to address the
crisis  of  universalism that  pertains  Europe  since  the  end of  the  nineteenth
5 Hua VI, 348; HUSSERL 1965, 192.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 4, n. 1 (2016)
Facing Global Crises After Europe                                                                                 11
century. Although universalism was not a European invention – pace Husserl –
SCHELKSHORN acknowledges that since the fifteenth century European powers
imposed  a  process  of  globalization  through  scientific  and  technological
discoveries, capitalistic industrial production, as well as by struggling for the
application of normative and legal principles that remained confined for a long
time to  European  soil.6 In  few decades,  the  fall  of  Byzantium,  the  Spanish
Reconquista and the so-called “discovery of the Americas” brought European
powers to a new global  level.  With the globalization of the conflicts among
European powers, at the beginning of the twentieth century, war itself became
global (even in its label of “World War”). The world became Europeanized as
never before and Europe lost its hegemony, as it was split by the Iron curtain
into two spheres of external influence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union
and a short decade of American predominance, the globe is now dealing with
the  rise  of  few regional  powers,  besides  the  U.S.  SCHELKSHORN defines  this
situation  in  terms  of  a  “polycentric  global  society”  (polyzentrische
Weltgesellschaft). 
What role can Europe have in the world to come? This is the question that
SCHELKSHORN tackles while  analyzing the  longue  durée of  the  strategy which
aimed at delimiting Europe, by opposing to it ideas and values of the “East”
(be it Asia, Byzantium or Russia), and by excluding the Hispanic world (both
the  Iberian  peninsula  and  Latin  America)  from  Europe’s  core.  Since  the
fifteenth  century,  with  the  work  of  Juan  Ginés  de  Sepúlveda,  Herodotus'
representation of the Persian wars, as the struggle between European freedom
and Asiatic despotism has become central in the narrative “mytho-dynamics”
(Mythomotorik) of Christian Europe against the Islamic world, as well as in the
opposition against Russia.
SCHELKSHORN underlines the crucial role that this succession of eras played for
the  birth  of  modern  Europe:  from  the  convivencia in  Al-Andalus  (i.e.  the
multicultural society among Muslims, Christians and Jews under the Islamic
domination in the Iberian peninsula), to the  reconquista  (i.e. the defeat of the
Islamic power in Andalusia), until Spanish colonialism in Latin America.
By presenting Russian and Spanish thinkers that, throughout nineteenth and
early twentieth century, addressed the question of whether (and how) Spain
and  Russia  belong  to  Europe,  SCHELKSHORN deconstructs  the  narratives  of
Europe’s  core,  and thus  contends  that  a  critical  revision  of  the  stereotypes
attributed to Europe’s counterparts (e.g. Asia, Islam, Russia or even Hispanic
countries)  is  still  necessary.  Only  through  a  critical  acquaintance  with  the
complexity of the histories of these identitarian attempts, can Europe seriously
6 See on this, JOAS 2015.
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engage  with  its  contemporary  geopolitical  challenges,  especially  regarding
Russia's regaining of power at Europe's eastern borders, the ongoing wars in
the south-eastern coasts of the Mediterranean sea, and the tragic migration of
thousands who are struggling to reach the European territory from both Africa
and  the  Middle  East.  A  post-imperial  delimitation  of  European  global
responsibility is at stake here.
The  “imperial  dream”  was  until  1945  the  only  paradigm  in  European
Machtpolitik. With the shift from a European to a global perspective, which the
winners  of  the  Second World  War  imposed on the  remains  of  the  modern
European states, some intellectuals and politicians, committed to the European
resistance and post-war reconstruction, revived the Kantian regulative idea of a
cosmopolitan federation of republics. Roberto  CASTALDI retraces this federalist
tradition by addressing both Norbert Elias’ analysis of the decline of European
civilization and Arnold Toynbee’s plea to European people: “unite or perish”.
In light of the current geopolitical and institutional crises, CASTALDI addresses
the threats that “de-civilizing processes” such as the economic disparities, the
crisis of the welfare-state, and the rise of populism and xenophobia, represent
for  Europe.  What  CASTALDI calls  “European  civilization”  is  actually  a  late
achievement  of  a  few  (Western-)European  countries  during  the  Cold  War.
Shielded as they were by the American military protectorate on one side, and
goaded  on  the  other  by  the  communist  challenge,  the  states  that  built  the
European  Communities  ensured  the  respect  of  the  rule  of  law  that  their
constitutions  guaranteed,  and  therefore  implemented  innovative  social
democratic  policies  which  were  carried  both  by  Christian  democrats  and
socialists. The “Fall of the Wall” accelerated the transition from the institutional
framework  of  the  European  Communities  to  the  European  Union.  After  a
decade of relative quiet  and prosperity within its  borders – from which its
neighbours did not benefit so much, as the Yugoslavian Wars bitterly showed –
a cascade of events eventually shook the fragile pillars of the Union: the 2008
economic crisis, the geopolitical turmoil in the Mediterranean sea that followed
the so-called Arab Spring,  and the imperialistic  policy of  Russia  in  Eastern
Europe.
Despite the oft-touted similarities between the financial and economic crisis
of 2008 and the Great Depression of 1929 and its tragic aftermath in Central
Europe,  which  paved  the  way  to  the  Nazi  takeover,  the  international
community did not respond to the 2008 crisis with protectionist and nationalist
politics, but it rather attempted to foster international coordination. However,
as  CASTALDI stresses,  this  positive  reaction  remained  stuck  in  inter-
governmental agreements and the European Union was thus unable to achieve
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the  implementation  of  supranational  policies  that  the  Commission  and  the
European  Parliament  recommended.  In  contrast,  long-lasting  emergency
summits of the European Council led to the application of austerity politics,
and to the implementation of ordoliberalist policies to single Member States
(see  on  this  Timo  MIETTINEN’s  contribution  to  this  issue).  In  this  context,
Germany took on, willy-nilly, the role of central power of Europe. This shift of
power  from  the  institutions  of  Europe  to  its  most  powerful  member  state
revived the fear of the geopolitical issue of the Mitte, i.e. of Europe’s core and
pivotal space. In order to achieve and maintain a favourable balance of power
in the nineteenth century, Bismark aimed at ruling the  Mitte by means of his
Realpolitik.  Then,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  First  World  War,  the  role  of  this
political space became a prerogative of radical ideologies, such as that assumed
by the Third Reich.  Ever mindful  of  this tragic past,  contemporary German
elites nevertheless acknowledge their pivotal role and drawn into a position of
economic leadership. They are, however, unwilling to take the responsibility of
representing the Mitte on a geopolitical level.7
The decision to rule the monetary union as a coordination of national politics
led  to  a  dysfunctionality  of  the  euro,  of  which  its  designers  –  especially
Germany and Italy – were well aware. Nonetheless, they decided to run the
risk, in order to hopefully overcome France’s resistance to sharing economic
sovereignty.  In  2008,  Sarkozy’s  France  was  ready  to  share  the  burden  of  a
supranational  umbrella,  although Merkel’s  and Schäuble’s Germany was no
longer ready to do so. As a consequence of this, the countries that adopted the
euro  were  burdened  by  this  monetary  confederation  with  more  fiscal  and
economic constraints than it  would be the case if  they were part of a fully-
fledged federation (without even relying on fiscal, economic and social federal
adjustments!). The EU thus started to demand more and to give less than a
federation can do, and it consequently became a system intrusive enough to be
blamed by its citizens, but not strong enough to guarantee economic order. The
coordination  of  budget  rules,  without  shared  economic  policies,  caused  a
differential access to credit within the monetary union (the so-called “spread”),
and  created  unequal  conditions  in  the  single  European  market,  thereby
contradicting  the  assumption  of  ordoliberalism  that  free  economy  can  be
functionally guaranteed only if the state ensures equilibrium and equality in
the market.
Conceived by German economists as a moral stimulus to punish bad politics
and to force  reforms,  austerity  measures are  in fact  giving new impetus to
populistic  movements  all  around  the  continent.  The  negotiations  at  the
7 See on this, MÜNKLER 2015.
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European summits are indeed perceived by the populations in a stereotypical
way, as a mere rehashing of British and French imperial pasts, and of German
hunger for power. The Brexit campaign shows how strong the wartime image
of  Germany  still  is  in  the  collective  imaginary,  and  how  Germano-phobic
slogans can still be effective. 
As in the aftermath of the Great Depression, socio-psychological feelings of
decline  are  spreading  in  many  European  countries,  generating  xenophobic
fears and the hunt for scapegoats. This dangerous mood became a pervasive
political attitude in the West (especially in France) after the terroristic attacks
carried  out  by  the  Islamic  State,  as  well  as  in  Central  European  countries,
which  are  now  crossed  by  migration  flows  coming  from  the  Middle  East
through  the  Balkans.  In  light  of  this  situation,  the  legitimacy  of  European
institutions  to  handle  these  economic  and  political  problems  is  put  into
question by European citizens, who rather see a possible path out of all these
troubles in a return to strong national  identities.  New forms of nationalism
throughout the European countries can be explained as a consequence of the
inability of Europe to effectively face its internal crisis. In order to contrast this
tendency,  CASTALDI proposes  a  federalist  solution,  which  consists  of  a
substantial enhancement of supranational institutions. For this to happen, it is
of utmost importance to rethink the relationship between democracy and the
people by decoupling the notions of state and nation, or at least of ethnos and
demos, i.e.  the sovereign community of the citizens on one hand, and their
national and ethnic community on the other. 
This  was  the  idea  at  the  core  of  Altiero  Spinelli’s  federalist  thought  and
political  activity.  Spinelli,  an anti-Stalinist  communist  who was banned and
imprisoned by the fascist regime, acknowledged in the 1930s that national and
soviet imperialisms were the main causes of the European wars and therefore
identified in the federation of the European states the supranational authority
that  could  ensure  peace,  constitutional  freedoms,  and  economic  wealth  to
European  citizens. According  to  CASTALDI, Constitutional  Europeanism  has
both  a  cultural  and  an  institutional  aspect.  He  suggests  that  the  European
Union should enhance both its supranational and post-national characteristics.
First, it should reinforce its suprarnational (i.e. federal) institutions, by turning
the  Commission  into  a  real  European  governing  body,  which  must  take
responsibility  in  front  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  European
Council,  playing  the  role  of  a  High  Chamber  that  represents  the  member
states.8 According  to  Jürgen  Habermas,  by  sharing  sovereignty  with  the
Parliament  and  delegating  the  executive  functions  to  the  Commission,  the
8 Among the many suggestions in this direction, see SPINELLI GROUP 2013. 
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Council would respect the double sovereignty that the European citizenship
guarantees.9 Every European citizen is, in fact, both citizen of a nation state and
of  the  European  Union.  European  Institutions  must,  therefore,  respect  the
sovereignty of both European citizens and nations, which are represented by
the Council. By sharing their power not only among each other but also with
the European Parliament, the leaders of the Member States would pave the way
for European post-national politics. Europe’s self-limitation, in the frame of a
polycentric society – as wished by SHELKSHORN – can be ensured, according to
CASTALDI,  only  within  federal  European institutions.  It  is,  therefore,  time to
address the problem of sovereignty in view of the effective democratization of
Europe: a democracy which takes into account both the single demos of the
European citizen, as highlighted by the federalistic actions, and the different
demoi of the nation states, as stressed by the theoreticians of “demoicracy”.10
Britains  decision  to  leave  the  European  Union  urgently  poses  the  question
whether  and in  which respect  the  Union should opt  for  becoming either  a
confederation of democratic states or the democratic federation of its citizens in
one demos, or even a mix of the two. If Europe still believes that it consists of
the  supranational  project  of  a  synthesis  between  nations  that  are  not  only
united by their common origins, but that are rather entangled in the rational
exchange  of  ideas  in  individual  responsibility,  as  Husserl  suggests,  the
European  Union  should  look  for  the  institutional  framework  that  best
embodies and enables this ideal task.
Among the submitted articles, we present four complementary approaches to
the  crisis,  understood as  an  economic,  political  and  cultural  issue.  On one
hand, James  MENSCH and Timo  MIETTINEN deal with the economic crisis that
has  afflicted  Europe  since  2008.  While  MENSCH proposes  a  psychological
interpretation  of  the  inner  conflict  between  political  and  economic
understandings  of  the  European  project,  MIETTINEN analyzes  the
methodological  background  of  the  ruling  economic  policies,  namely
ordoliberalism, and in so doing goes back to Walter Eucken’s interpretation of
phenomenology.  On  the  other  hand,  Rebecca  DEW and  Christian  STERNAD
situate  the  crisis  issue  within  wider  narratives  regarding  modernity  and
Europe.  DEW acknowledges  the  presence  of  elective  affinities  among  the
critiques that twentieth-century German thinkers, such as Arendt, Jaspers and
Strauss, addressed to modernity, which correspond for them to a dissolution of
values.  From  a  different,  but  similar  angle,  STERNAD analyzes  the
9 See HABERMAS 2014.
10 See CHENEVAL/SCHIMMELFENNIG 2013, NICOLAÏDIS 2013; . CHENEVAL/ NICOLAÏDIS 2016.
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understanding  of  the  genesis  of  Europe,  in  terms  of  a  philosophical  and
religious issue, following Husserl, Patočka, Zambrano and Derrida. 
James  MENSCH addresses  the  current  European  crisis  from  a
phenomenological-psychological  perspective.  Provocatively,  he  suggests  to
interpret the crisis of the European monetary union in terms of an identity
split,  which  demands  analysis  in  psychopathological  terms,  as  a  “multiple
personality  disorder”.  In  line  with  Plato’s  analogy  between  soul  and state,
MENSCH drafts  a  psychological  diagnosis,  according to  which  the  European
monetary union presents different “personalities” that, on regular basis, take
full control of its behaviour, while their respective memories are subjected to
selective amnesia. By referring both to Husserl’s understanding of egological
identity and to Freud’s teleological interpretation of post-traumatic strategies,
MENSCH applies these paradigms to the European Union. In this perspective, he
maintains  that  the  European  project  results  from the  traumas  that  marked
Europe  during  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  Unable  as  it  was  to
properly  elaborate  these  traumas,  Europe  remained  stuck  between  two
“personalities”, i.e. two fundamental aims: on one hand, the political task of
establishing a peaceful system, based on freedom, democracy and cooperation,
and of guaranteeing fundamental social, political, and economic rights; on the
other hand, the hidden dream of recovering the centrality that Europe had in
the  past,  when  it  was  the  strongest  world  power.  MENSCH identifies  two
strategies,  behind this contradictory identity.  On one side,  he highlights the
presence of a personality that fears that World Wars were caused by economic
catastrophes  (high  inflation-rate  in  Germany,  Great  Depression,  etc.),  and
reassures itself by mastering economy by political means, and by guaranteeing
civil and social rights, as well as the welfare state. On the other side, there is
another personality that, conversely, believes that World Wars were caused by
political nationalism, and, thus hopes to overcome the crisis by integrating the
different  European  economies  and by depriving them of  the  independence
they require to fight each other. This personality split shows its pathological
effects  in  the  current  institutional  crises  of  the Union,  which  is  not  able  to
provide  an  institutional  framework  to  integrate  and  overcome  this
contradiction.
In fact, as MENSCH shows, political and economic collectives behave according
to opposite forms of recognition:  while  those who live within a democratic
framework are at the same time, in their quality as citizens, both the makers of
laws (through their representatives) and the subjects of those laws, as workers,
on the other side, they alienate their political rights to their employers. After
the 2008 financial crisis the citizens at the periphery of Europe discovered the
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loss of their rights as citizens, as soon as the “executive agency” was claimed
by  the  holders  of  their  countries’  bonds,  and  no  longer  by  their  political
representatives,  who  were  forced  to  calm  the  markets  by  implementing
reforms. Because of their high debt level, many member states of the European
periphery  were  forced  to  outsource  their  political  sovereignty  to  financial
capitalism,  in  order  to  pay  back  the  political  time  they  had  bought  in  the
previous decades by short-term borrowings.11
The  economic  tradition  that  is  currently  leading  Europe  is  German
ordoliberalism, an economic position that corresponds much more to a moral
stance than to a specific economic doctrine.  MIETTINEN proposes an in-depth
analysis of the philosophical background of ordoliberalism, by focusing on the
figure  of  Walter  Eucken  who  is  considered  its  symbolic  father.  MIETTINEN
sketches the historical background of the  Methodenstreit among economists in
late  nineteenth  Century  and  situates  Eucken’s  approach  in  the  historical
context  of  Freiburg  university,  where  he  was  one  of  the  very  few  who
attempted an intellectual response to the political and economic crisis of the
1930s by combining a scientific critique of the centralized approach of National
Socialism  and  Stalinism  with  his  personal  engagement  in  the  Freiburg
resistance circle. 
Eucken’s  liberal  stance  is  characterized  by  a  strong  emphasis  on
constitutional choice and institutional issues. According to this view, the core
of  economic  life  is  identified  in  the  economic  constitution
(Wirtschaftsverfassung), and not for instance in the division of labour, or in the
relation  of  power  and technological  level.  Unlike  neoliberalism,  the  central
element  of  economics  consists  of  the  law,  and  not  of  individual  choices.
Considering the legal and moral  order as the basis of  liberalism (hence the
word “ordoliberalism”), economics is understood as the normative science of
ideal forms that have to be implemented in the life-wolrd, in order to guarantee
order, norm stability and the dismantling of monopolies. 
Whilst Foucault considered Husserl’s phenomenology  toutcourt as the main
background for the idealistic approach of ordoliberalism, MIETTINEN refers this
approach back to Eucken’s reading of Husserl, and thus shows how Eucken
conflates  Husserl’s  accurate  distinction between several  realms of  idealities,
especially  ignoring  the  concrete  bond  that,  according  to  genetic
phenomenology,  links material  (i.e.  non formal)  idealities to their  life-world
horizons. 
While Husserl’s  ethics situates the maxim: “do your best  under the given
circumstances” in concrete and individual situations as a plea for  renewing
11 See on this, STREECK 2014.
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decisions  and  even  norms,  Eucken’s  ordoliberalism neglects,  in  MIETTINEN’s
reading,  the  inequalities  that  are  de  facto widespread among market  actors.
According  to  ordoliberalism,  economics  should  be  understood  as  an  exact
science, and should therefore deal with ideal forms rather than with concrete
production and exchange. When, after the Second World War, ordoliberalism
became the leading school of thought in the German Federal Republic, it led,
on one side, to the design of an ideal legal framework and of an impartial and
strong  governance;  on  the  other,  it  also  led  to  a  strict  separation  between
economics and politics. 
The  foundational  decision  for  this  economic  system  is  the  only  political
moment  where  economics  and  politics  converge.  Besides  that,  there  is  no
longer space for genuine politics within the economic domain. This stance was
probably motivated by Eucken’s resistance against National Socialism in the
1930s: by pleading for a free economy, arbitrated by a fair and impartial state,
Eucken  stood  for  liberalism  both  in  economics  and  politics.  He  therefore
stressed the rule of ideal laws against the thread of pressures by economic and
political groups. Nonetheless,  his understanding of economics as a realm of
exact idealities led to a problematic hypostatization of law and order as the
basic tools of economic policies. In this respect, he neglects the more dynamic
aspects of Husserl’s understanding of the role of ideals in concrete moral life.
In the end, MIETTINEN concludes his historical and philosophical reconstruction
by showing how the current governance of the monetary union is driven by the
ordoliberal credo. 
Rebecca  DEW addresses the crisis concept by dealing with Hannah Arendt,
Karl  Jaspers,  Leo  Strauss,  and  their  critiques  of  modernity,  which  she
understands as “thoughtful perspectives in a thoughtless age”. Starting from
the  overlapping  of  the  anti-modernist  stances,  which  are  present  in  these
philosophers’  thought,  DEW comes  to  show  their  affinity  with  Heidegger’s
account of Western metaphysics, as well as with his project of forcing a new
metaphysical beginning. 
Aaccording to Arendt, a sort of “thought deprivation” is one of the shapes
that  decline  takes  in  modernity  and  especially  in  modern  philosophy.  For
Arendt, modernity is at its core a crisis of forgetfulness, the loss of tradition
and  authority  in  politics  and  education.  Jaspers  used  similar  terms,  while
dealing  with  modernity  in  terms  of  a  process  of  bureaucratization  and
technologization, of which isolation, consumerism, and the emergence of mass
society  were  the  most  apparent  traits.  Strauss  stressed,  on  his  side,  the
devastation of traditional ways of living, which according to him was mainly
caused by Western thinkers, such as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Common to
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all these interpretations – as well as to Heidegger’s – is an understanding of
modernity as tragically detached from a past “golden age”, in which a greater
level of truth and authenticity characterized human existence.12
Whilst  Jaspers  pleads  for  human  responsibility  as  a  way  to  contrast  the
danger of atomic desasters, whose catastrophe he understands as the symptom
of the application of specialized sciences to the world of human affairs, Arendt
suggests that modernity itself is a catastrophe of thought and of language: a
worldless era, in which humankind lives in isolation and alienation, under the
“law of the desert”.13 According to both Strauss and Arendt, philosophy is a
core  element  of  modernity;  whilst  the  former,  though,  identifies  modern
philosophy in the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Nietzsche, for Arendt the
site of rupture, which determines the birth of modern thought, corresponds
rather to Descartes’s methodological doubt. In Strauss’ reading, the spreading
of this generalized mistrust in the world manifests better than anything else the
crisis and instability of contemporary society.
In order to oppose modern scepticism, these thinkers invoke a reduction of
the claims of science, which should not be understood as the topos of human
rationality, but rather as a limited academic endeavour, with restricted political
applicability. Moreover, today’s science should refer back to its ancient-Greek
models, in order to re-establish the centrality of thinking, in our thoughtless
era.  Following these  arguments,  DEW goes  as  far  as  to  foresee  the  possible
rising of a new form of polity to come, which would be heir of both Roman
republican and nation-state models. This new political formation might be able
to provide its members with a new “home”, i.e. with new sense of ownership,
belonging,  and continuity,  which would be founded on a renewed care  for
natality, beyond any ethnical and religious prejudice.
In  his  reconstruction  of  Europe’s  genealogy,  Christian  STERNAD follows  a
similar interpretative path. After having pinpointed what for him are the limits
of Husserl’s reduction of “spiritual Europe” to a form of universal rationality,
STERNAD undertakes  a  deconstruction  of  Husserl’s  unilateral  account,  by
problematizing the role that Christianity played in the European construction.
In so doing, he goes along with Patočka’s, Zambrano’s and Derrida’s attempts
to overcome Husserl’s rationalism.
12 This sense of loss, and of nostalgia for a greater past, cannot be limited to philosophical research,
but  is  rather  widespread  in  the  various  intellectual  accounts  of  the  crisis  of  modernity,  which
emerged in the first decades of twentieth century. See on this, for instance, SPENGLER 1926-28; ORTEGA
Y GASSET 1958; HUIZINGA 1936.
13 Interestingly enough,  this  same metaphor also  emerges in Heidegger’s  Schwarze  Hefte,  denoting
modernity’s effects, which Heidegger understands though as caused by the Jewish machinery. See
on this, DI CESARE 2014.
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According  to  STERNAD,  Husserl’s  understanding  of  Europe,  as  it  is  solely
grounded  on  a  philosophical  stance,  risks  causing  a  “mystification  of  the
history of culture”. This phrase was coined by Derrida, in order to pinpoint the
hypocritical  nature  of  any  mono-genealogical  account  of  Europe’s  origins.
STERNAD argues  that  Husserl’s  attempt  to  save  rationality  led  him  to  the
exclusion  of  religious  traditions,  understood  as  historical,  cultural,  social,
political and even ethical forces. According to this interpretation, Husserl’s plea
for cultural renewal by means of practical reason is interpreted as an attack
against traditional forms of life conduct.
Unlike Husserl,  Patočka considered Europe both a rational  and a Christian
project,  distinguishing  thereby  between  theoretical  logos  and  religious
rationality. The theoretical stance can be either scientific, i.e. aimed at coping
with reality, or philosophical, as it is oriented towards the essence of what is.
Religion, on the other hand, corresponds in its core to an a-theoretical form of
rationality, which cannot be properly grasped by philosophy. Patočka criticizes
Husserl  for  having  overlooked,  in  his  genealogy  of  European  rationality,
Europe’s hidden religious component.  Since reason has two complementary
faces  –  one  based on mystical  worship,  and  one  on sober  intellectualism –
problems  emerge  as  soon  as  the  latter  demands  universal  validity.  In  this
respect,  STERNAD lingers on Patočka’s suggestion that Europe has not been yet
able to develop a properly Christian rationality. This kind of rationality might
indeed  become  the  most  powerful  recovery  from  the  decadence  that  the
oblivion  of  the  care  for  the  soul  and  the  predominance  of  technical
administration in modern times have caused.
Whilst Patočka underlined the need of intermingling theoretical and religious
reason,  Maria  Zambrano  dealt  with  Catholicism  in  terms  of  the  authentic
Augustinian  philosophy.  Doing  this,  she  interpreted  religion  as  the  vera
philosophia that  the  Greeks  prepared  and  the  Church  later  fulfilled,  by
attempting to realize the civitas Dei on earth. Following this interpretation, the
crisis to which the First World War gave birth is essentially a religious crisis. 
As  for  Derrida,  STERNAD shows how in  1989  he  started a  reflection  upon
Europe’s identity and future, in light of the events which shook Eastern Europe
and also of the bicentenary of the French revolution. In the aftermath of the
wars of twentieth century, Derrida pleads for an unrealized Europe, an idea
that has yet to rise, and for a Europe that cannot accept identity with itself. Any
discourse about Europe in form of an autobiography should be therefore be
replaced by a narration from a point of view of alterity. 
Starting  from  Patočka’s  claim  that  Christianity  is  still  the  unthought-of
element of Europe, Derrida stresses that Christianity as such is still yet to come.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 4, n. 1 (2016)
Facing Global Crises After Europe                                                                                 21
Expanding on this idea, he suggests that an authentically Christian Europe, in
order to be developed in its full-fledged potentialities, should get rid of every
Greek  remnant.  He  points  to  the  Platonic  polis as  the  obstacle  to  the  full
unfolding of authentic Christian politics. According to Derrida’s speculations,
Europe can have a future only if  it  takes  a  distance  both from Athens and
Rome, breaking up with Greek-Platonic-Roman politics.  Only by doing this,
could  it  eventually  reach  an  authentic  religious  experience,  or  mysterium
tremendum. 
Following Patočka, Zambrano and Derrida, STERNAD ends up arguing for the
necessity of an understanding of Europe that does not rely only on its origins,
but that rather tackles the contradictions which inhere to its conflictual identity
and that refuses any unilateral account of reason.
We are honoured to share in the section “Path of Method” Giovanni PIANA’s
reflections upon phenomenology as a method, translated from the Italian by
Michela Summa.
PIANA’s quest for a rigorous phenomenology begins with a disambiguation of
phenomenology’s famous plea: “back to the things themselves”. Reading this
claim against the background of Gestalt psychology, PIANA argues that it is not a
generic  plea  for  philosophical  innocence  or  the  appeal  to  a  conscious
dismantling of every kind of unconscious prejudices, but rather the uncovering
of a set  of  well-determined opinions,  with precise theoretical  consequences,
mostly inspired by psychological associationism.
PIANA distinguishes the theoretical core of phenomenology as a philosophical
method (distinguished from preliminary stages of psychological research) and
Husserl’s attempt to use it for responding to the appeals and tensions of his
historical moment. For Husserl, the problem of method became entangled with
ethical  tasks,  while  phenomenology  took  more  and  more  the  shape  of  a
philosophy of subjectivity, until the idea of phenomenology was presented as
the only answer to the concept of crisis. PIANA is quite annoyed by epigonic re-
propositions of this overlapping of method and crisis. While the rhetoric of the
crisis gets poorer the more it is iterated outside of its historical horizon, the
theoretical core of phenomenology as a method can be grasped in its validity
only beyond it as the analytic task driven by a theory of the intentionality of
conscious acts. 
In the line of this analytic interpretation of phenomenology, PIANA sets clarity
as the first goal of philosophy, i.e. bringing order into thinking. And, for the
sake of  clarity,  he does not  hesitate  to define phenomenology as a – rather
complex and sophisticated – intuitionistic method. However, intuition does not
have to be intended as a special form of knowledge for otherwise inaccessible
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truths, not as the leap into metaphysical realms, but rather as a method to trace
modes of being by describing structural modes of manifestation. The goal is
not  to  describe  phenomenological  givens,  but  phenomenological  rules  or
structures:  it  is  to  sketch  a  phenomenologically  grounded  ontology.
Philosophical analysis deals with the process of “concept formation” from the
inner structures of experience up to more independent idealities, from general
regularities that are directly graspable in the configuration of what is given to
more abstract concepts.
Finally,  PIANA underlines  that  his  structural  approach  to  phenomenology,
presented also through the metaphor of “a geometry of experience”, radically
departs  from  existentialistic  motives  present  in  the  tradition  of
phenomenology.
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